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Oral arguments are scheduled for Wednesday, January 31, 2018, at 9:30 
a.m. in the Courtroom of the Montana, Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek 




The question in this case is whether the attorney-client privilege 
covers an attorney’s communication to a client about a public court date. 
This case arose after the petitioner, defense attorney Shannon Sweeney, 
refused to disclose her communication with a client who had failed to 
show up to a mandatory pre-trial conference and was consequently 
charged with bail jumping. The State subpoenaed Sweeney for the 
communications and documents between Sweeney and her client to prove 
the required knowledge element in the client’s felony bail jumping case, 
but Sweeney has asserted that any communication with her client is 
protected under the attorney-client privilege.  
This case is significant because it will help define the scope of 
Montana’s unique attorney-client privilege. Sweeney now asks the 
Montana Supreme Court to issue a Writ of Supervisory Control to advise 
the district court whether this particular type of communication is 
protected by the attorney-client privilege.  
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On May 25, 2016, the Anaconda-Deer Lodge District Court 
appointed Shannon Sweeney to represent Dakota James McClanahan in a 
drug-related criminal case.1 The district court released McClanahan on his 
own reconnaissance and ordered him to maintain contact with his attorney 
and to make all court appearances.2 When McClanahan did not show up 
for his mandatory pre-trial conference, the State charged him with bail 
jumping.3 To convict a defendant of bail jumping, the State must prove the 
defendant had knowledge of the court date, and “purposefully fail[ed] 
without lawful excuse to appear at that time and place.”4 To prove the 
                                                     
1 Petition for a Writ of Supervisory Control at 2, Sweeney v. Mont. Third Dist. Court, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-0677%20Writ%20-
%20Supervisory%20Control%20--%20Petition?id={608DC05F-0000-CF12-AEE2-5704FB011F41} 
(Mont. Nov. 15, 2017) (OP 17-0677) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Petition].  
2 District Court’s Response to Petition for a Writ of Supervisory Control at 2, Sweeney v. Mont. 
Third Dist. Court, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-
0677%20Petition%20for%20Writ%20--%20Response/Objection?id={90103360-0000-C712-8619-
B9B6B58EF1BA} (Mont. Dec. 07, 2017) (OP 17-0677) [hereinafter Respondent’s Response Brief].  
3 Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 2; Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 2–3.  
4 Mont. Code Ann. § 45–7–309 (2017); State v. Blackbird, 609 P.2d 708 (Mont. 1980). 
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knowledge element of bail jumping, the State subpoenaed Sweeney to 
have her testify that she informed McClanahan about his upcoming pre-
trial conference.5  
 Sweeney believed that testifying against her client or disclosing 
any communication between herself and her client constituted a violation 
of the attorney-client privilege.6 Sweeney requested a hearing to assert this 
privilege and argue her positions, but the district court denied her request.7  
She moved to quash subpoenas from the State to appear and testify.8 The 
district court denied her motion but granted a motion in limine from the 
State, ruling that Sweeney only had to testify whether she had informed 
McClanahan about the final pre-trial conference.9 In response to this 
ruling, Sweeney submitted a petition for a writ of supervisory control to 






The Montana Supreme Court only issues a writ of supervisory 
control in exigent cases where: 
(a) the other court is proceeding under a mistake of law 
and is causing a gross injustice; (b) constitutional issues 
of state-wide importance are involved; or (c) the other 
court has granted or denied a motion for substitution of a 
judge in a criminal case.10  
Here, Sweeney argues that the district court’s denial of her request 
to invoke the attorney-client privilege in this case is a constitutional issue 
of state-wide importance and that the district court is proceeding under a 
mistake of law by ruling that the privilege does not apply.11 
Sweeney asserts that she is obligated to protect and not disclose 
information shared between herself and McClanahan as a matter of both 
the attorney-client privilege and her duty of confidentiality. First, she 
asserts that the attorney-client privilege is applicable.12 Sweeney states the 
                                                     
5 Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 2; Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 3. 
6 Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 8; Mont. Code Ann. § 26–1–803. 
7  Brief of the Amicus Curiae Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, The National Association for Public Defense, and Sherry 
Staedler, Regional Deputy of the Office of the Public Defender for Region 5 at 5, Sweeney v. Mont. 
Third Dist. Court, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-0677%20Amicus%20--
%20Brief?id={D0BD3160-0000-C510-8B6F-CF5208264157} (Mont. Dec. 6, 2017) (OP 17-0677) 
[hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief]. 
8 Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 5; Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 4; 
Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 3. 
9 Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 20; Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
10 Mont. Code Ann. § 25–21–14 (2017); Larry Howell, Montana’s Unique Writ of Supervisory 
Control, TR. TRENDS 15 at 23 (2009), https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals/47/.  
11 Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 5. 
12 Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 8.  
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attorney-client privilege is a bedrock of our legal system, protecting any 
communications between an attorney and a client within the scope of legal 
representation that were made in confidence.13 She argues that the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to keep her 
communications privileged.14  
Sweeney dismisses the eight elements used by the Montana 
Supreme Court to define the scope of the attorney-client privilege.15 These 
elements include: 
(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought,  
(2) from a professional legal advisor in her capacity as 
such,  
(3) the communications relating to that purpose,  
(4) made in confidence,  
(5) by the client,  
(6) are at this instance permanently protected,  
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,  
(8) unless the protection be waived.16  
Sweeney suggests the Montana Supreme Court use this 
opportunity to simplify their jurisprudence. She argues “simply, the statute 
only requires communication.” Sweeney believes that to prove the 
knowledge element of bail jumping, she would have to disclose both 
whether she communicated the court date to McClanahan and whether 
McClanahan somehow communicated his understanding to her. By 
couching these exchanges in terms of “communication,” Sweeney argues 
that these exchanges constitute protected communications.17  
Sweeney also cites her ethical duty against disclosure and, more 
specifically, a Montana Bar Ethics Opinion on Rule 1.6 of the Montana 
Rules of Professional Conduct.18 This opinion advises attorneys against 
telling the district court whether their client has checked in as a 
requirement of bond unless the client gives consent.19 Although the district 
court did not find the advisory opinion binding, Sweeney argues “the rules 
and concepts upon which the opinion is based are not advisory.”20 
Sweeney has interpreted this to include communication of a third party 
                                                     
13 Mont. Code Ann. § 26–1–803; MONT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6; Inter-Fluve, 112 P.3d at 261 
(citing State ex rel. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Mont. Second Judicial District Court, 783 P.2d 911 
(Mont. 1989)); Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 6.  
14 MONT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(b)(4); Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 8; 
Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 9–10.  
15 State ex rel. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 783 P.2d at 914–915; Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 9–
10. 
16 State ex rel. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 783 P.2d at 914. 
17Id. 
18 MONT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6; State Bar of Mont., Ethics Op. 050621 (2005); Petitioner’s 
Petition, supra note 1, at 9.  
19 State Bar of Mont., Ethics Op. 050621; Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 9.   
20 MONT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6 (“a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client”); Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 9. 
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The respondents take the position that the attorney-client privilege 
is not applicable in this case. This stance represents the district court’s 
opinion; thus, the respondents argue that the lower court is not proceeding 
under a mistake of law. Additionally, they argue that if the attorney-client 
privilege is not at play, there are no constitutional issues implicated and 
Supervisory Control would not be appropriate.  
The respondents contend that Sweeney was conveying 
information from a third party (the court) to McClanahan and was not 
providing advice to a client in confidence.22 They conclude that Sweeney 
has failed to prove that the communication about the pre-trial date was 
made in confidence, one of the eight required elements of the attorney-
client privilege.23 Although other jurisdictions have distinguished this type 
of third-party communication, the Montana Supreme Court has not yet 
spoken on this issue.24 The most persuasive authority cited, United States 
v. Freeman, is also a bail-jumping case in which a district court required 
Freeman’s attorney to testify whether the defendant was informed by her 
attorney about a court order to appear.25 In Freeman, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that “the evidence sought to be elicited from [the 
attorney] was not of a confidential nature and hence was not protected by 
the attorney-client privilege.”26  
Further, the district court has the authority to order Sweeney to 
reveal the requested information because such a disclosure would be 
required “to comply with other law or a court order.”27  
The respondents also contend that there is no other option for 
proving the element of notice in this case.28 The only other person who can 
prove this element, McClanahan, is protected by the constitutional right 




The Amicus brief, submitted by Montana Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, et al. contends the Court should grant this petition 
                                                     
21 Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 12–13; Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 9–10;  
22 Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 7.  
23 State ex rel. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 783 P.2d at 914; Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, 
at 6.  
24 Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 6. 
25 United States v. Freeman, 519 F.2d 67, 68–69 (9th Cir. 1975); Respondent’s Response Brief, 
supra note 2, at 6–7.  
26 Freeman, 519 F.2d at 68.  
27 MONT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(b)(4); see also State Bar of Mont., Ethics Op. 050621. 
28 Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 8–9.  
29 Id. at 8; see U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
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because they argue that the attorney-client privilege should apply in this 
case and because they warn about the potentially disastrous impacts of 
denying this petition. The amici believe granting this petition will uphold 
candor to the tribunal, maintain the duty of confidentiality, and preserve 
legal traditions and professional standards.30 On the other hand, they argue 
that denying Respondent’s petition could destroy Respondent’s law 
practice and credibility, degrade attorney-client communication state-
wide, de-incentivize counsel’s attempts to locate, arrange, advice, or 
convince defendants to appear, and overburden the already strained Public 
Defender system.31  
The amici strongly defend Sweeney’s right not to testify on this 
issue, citing the attorney-client privilege, the duty of confidentiality, and 
the duty of loyalty.32 Absent a waiver by the client or any exceptions, this 
privilege bars disclosure of the requested information.33  
Next, the amici look at the bigger picture. They fear that 
compelling Sweeney to testify against her client may erode trust and 
hinder free communication between attorneys and clients in general. The 
policy behind the attorney-client privilege is to give both parties the 
freedom to express themselves openly.34 As amici point out, this is 
especially critical with court-appointed defense counsel,35 who are often 
called upon to “locate, arrange, advise, and sometimes even convince 
defendants to re-appear.”36 A decision for the Defense could lead defense 
attorneys to be less likely to perform those functions leading to more 
missed court dates and a decline in judicial efficiency.37 Further, the amici 
believe a decision for the respondents may erode trust between attorneys 
and clients. This erosion of trust may have tangible impacts for Sweeney 
and other small-town practitioners who may develop a reputation for 
testifying against clients.38  
Finally, the amici cite cases where the State used other evidence, 
such as “testimony of a District Court Clerk, legal assistants or through 
submissions of minute entries,” to prove the knowledge element of bail-




                                                     
30 Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at ii. 
31 Id. at 13–14, 25–27.  
32 Id. at 6.  
33 Id. at 6–7, 8.  
34 Palmer by Diacon v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 861 P.2d 895, 904–05 (1993); Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).  
35 Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 11–12.  
36 Id. at 14.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 13. 
39 State v. Nolan, 66 P.3d 269, 272 (Mont. 2003); State v. Kaske, 47 P.3d 824, 829 (Mont. 2002); 
State v. Wereman, 902 P.2d 1009, 1012 (Mont. 1995); Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 8.  





The petition for a writ of supervisory control will likely not be 
granted. Despite a brief heyday, writs of supervisory control are now used 
sparingly and are only appropriate where an appeal is insufficient to 
correct the mistake.40 The respondent’s best chance to succeed on this 
petition is to argue the “impact of the erroneous ruling.”41 Although the 
amici thoroughly covered potential impacts of denying attorney-client 
privilege, both the amici and petitioner have failed to show an appeal 
would be insufficient in this case. The Court has granted supervisory 
control in attorney-client privilege cases, but only on a case-by-case basis 
where it has examined the privileged material and concluded that an appeal 
would be insufficient.42 Thus far, petitioner has refused to reveal the 
contents of her communication with her client, even with a limiting motion 
in limine.43 
Additionally, the Court will likely agree with the respondents that 
the attorney-client privilege does not apply, thus the lower court is not 
proceeding under a mistake of law, nor are there state-wide constitutional 
issues involved. Since this is a novel legal issue, the Court may still issue 
a published opinion weighing in on the issue presented, or they may leave 
this issue to appeal.44  
The question of whether relaying court dates falls within the 
protection of the attorney-client privilege has not yet been decided in 
Montana, so the parties have looked to creative authorities. The 
respondents rely on jurisprudence from other jurisdictions, which all find 
that relaying court dates does not constitute communication.45 These cases 
come from multiple jurisdictions that also follow the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, including Rule 1.6.46 Sweeney’s argument, on the 
other hand, contends that Montana should adopt an interpretation of Rule 
1.6 found in a nonbinding advisory opinion from the Montana State Bar.47 
Unfortunately, the advisory opinion that Sweeney relies on specifically 
distinguishes itself from bail-jumping cases.48 For bail jumping cases, the 
Montana opinion defers to an ABA formal opinion that has since been 
                                                     
40 Howell, supra note 10, at 23. 
41 Id.   
42 See State ex rel. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 783 P.2d 911. 
43 Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 4. 
44 See Inter-Fluve v. Mont. Eighteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 112 P.3d 258 (Mont. 2005); Hegwood v. 
Mont. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 75 P.3d 308 (Mont. 2003).   
45 Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
46 Austin v. State, 934 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex. App. 1996); United States v. Freeman, 519 F.2d 67, 
68–69 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d 69, 74 (10th Cir. 1969); In re Grand Jury 
Proc., Des Moines, Iowa, 568 F.2d 555, 557 (8th Cir.1977); compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6 with ALASKA R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6, KAN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6, PA. 
DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6, and TEX. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6.  
47 MONT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6; State Bar of Mont., Ethics Op. 050621; Petitioner’s Petition, 
supra note 1. 
48 State Bar of Mont., Ethics Op. 050621 at 1. 
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specifically withdrawn because it is considered inconsistent with the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.49  
All the jurisdictions cited by the respondents allow 
communication of court dates under the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.50 Even if Sweeney’s reliance upon the nonbinding advisory 
opinion is warranted, the Montana Supreme Court has not hesitated to rule 
against these opinions in the past.51  
To address the mounting jurisdictions cited by the respondent, 
Sweeney and the amici argue that Montana should act independently on 
this issue due to our uniquely small Bar and small towns, where word 
travels quickly and an attorney can quickly earn a negative reputation by 
testifying against clients.52  Sweeney has described the worst possible 
outcomes in which this single decision undermines trust between clients 
and their attorneys. However, the jurisdictions cited by the respondents 
maintain their stance on this issue, speaking to the improbability of 
Sweeney’s threatened outcomes.53  
Even though a decision in favor of the respondents is unlikely to 
single-handedly eliminate client trust, it would certainly limit the scope of 
the attorney-client privilege. Any limitations of the attorney-client 
privilege should be carefully and narrowly defined.  
                                                     
49 ABA Standing Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 155 (1936); ABA Standing 
Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 84–349 (1984); State Bar of Mont., Ethics 
Op. 050621 at 1; see also MONT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6. 
50 Austin, 934 S.W.2d at 674; Freeman, 519 F.2d at, 68–69; Downie, 888 P.2d at 1308; In re 
Adoption of A.S.S., 907 P.2d 913; Bourassa, 411 F.2d at 74; In re Grand Jury Proc., 568 F.2d 557.  
51 State v. Landis, 43 P.3d 298 (Mont 2002); Campbell v. Bozeman Investors of Duluth, 964 P.2d 41 
(1998).  
52 See Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 6; Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 13. 
53 Austin, 934 S.W.2d at 674; Freeman, 519 F.2d at, 68–69; Downie, 888 P.2d at 1308; In re 
Adoption of A.S.S., 907 P.2d 913; Bourassa, 411 F.2d at 74; In re Grand Jury Proc., 568 F.2d 557.  
